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COMMENTS
Preventing Post- PepsiCo Disaster: A Proposal for Refining
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine*
Peter Huangt
Far and away the best prize that life offers is the chance to work
hard at work worth doing.1
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I. hTRODUCTION
Work plays a crucial role in any individual's life. In an ideal
world, everyone would be free to pursue whatever work she finds
most meaningful and rewarding. However, in the real world many
employers have important trade secrets that may be revealed by a
departing employee. That departing employee may be blocked from
pursuing meaningful and rewarding work because of the trade secrets
she knows. Trade secret law has long struggled to balance the
interests of departing employees with the equally legitimate interests
of their former employers. Unfortunately, that balance may be
threatened by the current development of a particular area of trade
secret law: the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine may provide employers with a
means to significantly limit employee mobility. This comment will
illustrate how the doctrine does not require that an employer prove
that a departing employee has revealed or currently intends to reveal
any trade secrets. Instead, the doctrine only focuses on whether the
departing employee is such a threat to the employer's trade secrets
that the employee's freedom to seek new work must be curtailed.
Employees in the high technology sectors are often exposed to
trade secrets, and the inevitable disclosure doctrine will be of special
interest to them. This comment will show that an extreme
interpretation of the doctrine may unacceptably restrict the freedom of
such employees. On the other hand, a balanced approach to the
inevitable disclosure doctrine may provide a valuable tool that
protects the interests of all parties involved. Some elements of
constitutional law may provide valuable suggestions on how to
develop such a balanced approach.
This comment will analyze the impact of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine on individuals whose work exposes them to trade
secrets. In Part II, basic trade secret law and background regarding
the inevitable disclosure doctrine will be set forth.
1999]
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In Part I, this comment will examine inevitable disclosure case
law in greater detail. This examination will reveal a lack of consistent
respect for the former employee's interest in free employee mobility.
Part IV will contrast inevitable disclosure doctrine with case law
applying constitutional substantive due process protections covering
analogous types of restrictions on employment. It will especially
focus on serious restrictions such as restrictions on entry into a
profession and the total deprivation of government employment. This
comment will argue that the constitutional commentary and case law
suggest interesting alternatives that may be helpful to current analysis
in inevitable disclosure cases.
Part V will attempt to combine ideas from recent inevitable
disclosure case law with substantive due process law to produce a
viable analytical framework that is applicable to inevitable disclosure
cases. Thus, this comment will attempt to use these ideas to provide a
fair and coherent approach to future inevitable disclosure analyses.
I1. BACKGROUND
A. Basic Trade Secret Law
The roots of trade secret law can be traced back to ancient
Rome.2 However, American trade secret law has mainly evolved
from state common law in the nineteenth century, and remains
primarily a state law matter.3 In the last 20 years, most states have
codified trade secret law through the adaptation of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' ("NCCUSL")
contribution to trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
("UTSA"). 4
The exact application of trade secret doctrine differs among the
various states.5 Perhaps the leading analytical framework is provided
by the UTSA, which was developed in 1979 to provide a model trade
secret code. Forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted
versions of it.6 The UTSA first requires that the plaintiff show that it
actually possessed a valuable trade secret.7 Second, the plaintiff must
2. See ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 29 (1997).
3. See id. at 31.
4. See id. at 32.
5. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS 2-27 to 2-28 (1997).
6. See MERGES, supra note 2, at 32.
7. See id. at 33.
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show that the defendant misappropriated that trade secret or seriously
threatens to do so.8
1. What is a trade secret?
The UTSA provides the following definition of a trade secret in
Section 1(4):
[A] 'Trade secret" [is] information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.9
The UTSA in Section 1(4)(i) broadly defines trade secret subject
matter. Any valuable information that is capable of providing
economic value to the plaintiff can be protected. However, the UTSA
circumscribes this broad definition with the requirement that the
information not be "generally known." 10
In addition, the plaintiff must show that it took reasonable
precautions under the circumstances to prevent the secret's
disclosure.IX This requirement does not mean the plaintiff must take
all optimal precautions available. 12 However, the plaintiff must be
consistently diligent in protecting information. 13 If the plaintiff freely
releases the disputed information to the public, the plaintiff has no
claim under trade secret law. 14
2. What constitutes misappropriation of a trade secret?
Once a plaintiff has established that she possessed a trade secret
8. See id.
9. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended 1985).
10. See MERGES, supra note 2, at 33. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(d)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (stating a trade secret must be "sufficiently secret to derive economic
value... from not generally being known to other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use .... ).
11. See MERGES, supra note 2, at 34.
12. See POOLEY, supra note 5, 4-27 to 4-28.
13. See MERGES, supra note 2, at 34. Examples of precautions include requiring
employees and licensees to sign confidentiality agreements, investing in physical security
measures, and designing products to not reveal trade secrets upon inspection. See id. at 55.
14. See id.
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under the UTSA, she must then show that the defendant
misappropriated the information, 15 either by wrongfully acquiring it,
or by misusing it in some way following a proper acquisition.
Thus, there are two basic types of misappropriation. The first
occurs when the defendant deliberately acquires information by
improper means and knows or should have known it to be the trade
secret of another. 16 The UTSA states that "improper means" of
acquisition "includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means. ' 17
The second type of misappropriation requires two analytical
steps. 18 The first step involves the acquisition of the trade secret, and
is satisfied if the defendant knows the trade secret was acquired
directly under a duty of confidence or knows the trade secret was
acquired directly by improper means. 19 It can also be met if the
defendant knows the trade secret was acquired by accident or
mistake.20 The second step is met if the defendant discloses or uses
the trade secret without authorization. 21 When both steps are met,
misappropriation occurs.
3. Trade Secret Remedies
When a plaintiff shows that its trade secret was misappropriated,
an array of remedies becomes available, including the possibility of
receiving royalties, actual and punitive damages, and attorneys fees.
Most typically, the plaintiff seeks an injunction prohibiting further use
by the defendant.22 A court will consider factors such as the potential
for irreparable harm to the plaintiff, the likelihood of harm to the
defendant from the injunction, the likelihood the plaintiff will succeed
on the merits of her suit, and the public interest.23 In trade secret
cases, the court will often tailor the injunction to equal the "headstart"
time that taking the trade secret provides the plaintiff.24 In the
15. See id. at 33.
16. See POOLEY, supra note 5, at 6-2.
17. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985).
18. See POOLEY, supra note 5, at 6-2.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See generally MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW 7-1 to 7-121 (1985 & Release
#25, Oct. 1998).
23. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
24. See POOLEY, supra note 5, at 7-36.
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employment setting, injunctions of varying scope have issued which
limit the ability of the former employee to work for a new employer
in the name of protecting against misappropriation. 25
4. Contract and the Former Employee
Former employees often pose a trade secret threat to their former
employers. Valuable competitive advantages can be instantly
destroyed or acquired as employees "jump ship" to rivals.26
Traditionally, employers have primarily relied on contract to solve
this problem.27 There are three general types of such contracts:
invention assignments, confidentiality agreements, and
noncompetition agreements. 28
Invention assignments confirm the employer's right to
intellectual property created by the employee during employment.29
Confidentiality agreements record the former employee's
acknowledgment that he will receive confidential information during
his employment and that he agrees to keep it secret.30 Finally,
noncompetition agreements limit the ability of the former employee
to compete with the former employer for customers. 31
There may be disputes about unequal bargaining power
regarding employment contracts. But at least with the traditional
contract framework, the employee usually can negotiate about her
post-employment conduct and in theory, receive adequate
compensation for any restriction. It is arguable that the government
should not interfere with the worker's freedom to contract as long as
she does not bear an unconscionable burden. This view has common
law support.3 2
5. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Developed to Further
Support Contract Protection of Employers from
Departing Employees
However, employers have not been completely satisfied by
25. See id. at 7-16 to 7-17.
26. See id. at 6-17 to 6-19.
27. See MERGES, supra note 2, at 83.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See d.
32. See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, § 1446 (3rd ed. 1968 & Supp. 1995).
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protection via contract.33 This dissatisfaction is particularly acute in
situations when a valued former employee leaves the employer to
work for a rival in the same field.34 In some situations, it will be
difficult for the employer to explicitly prove that its former employee
has revealed the former employer's trade secrets. 35  Thus,
confidentiality agreements can be difficult to enforce and sometimes
provide little practical protection.
As for noncompetition agreements, they often fail to provide
employers with the results they desire. First, like the high technology
powerhouse California, 36 some jurisdictions generally do not enforce
noncompetition agreements on the basis that they overly restrict
employee mobility.37 In almost all other states, noncompetition
agreements must pass judicial examination of reasonableness in time
and scope.38 Employers that overreach will either have the entire
agreement thrown out or the offending sections "blue-penciled" out.39
6. Overview of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Employers may desire more protection than employment
contracts can provide. Others may want another, more effective way
to control their former employees' behavior, regardless of whether a
restrictive covenant exists. A tool many former employers may turn
to is the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
In the leading cases, the inevitable disclosure doctrine has been
brought to bear against the former employee and the potential new
employer.40 The idea behind this move towards the use of the
doctrine is that sometimes "circumstantial evidence strongly
indicating a likelihood of misappropriation may be sufficient to
support an injunction, despite the defendant[s'] protestations to the
33. See Johanna L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable
Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV., 717,734 (1996).
34. See id.
35. See iL
36. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (1995).
37. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS Appendix 6A (1998) (listing
state statutes voiding restrictive covenants); e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West 1997 &
Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
38. Factors considered when determining reasonableness may include length of time,
geographic area covered, and scope of activity restricted. See Harlan M. Blake, Employment
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960).
39. POOLEY, supra note 5, at 8-36 to 8-37.
40. See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); Merck & Co. v. Lyon,
941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp,
1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
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contrary." 41 A court will examine factors such as whether a trade
secret exists,42 whether evidence shows the defendant "could not help
but use his knowledge in employment with a competitor," 43 as well as
what kind of injunction should be crafted to neutralize the threat.44
The gradual emergence of the inevitable disclosure doctrine may
have provided employers with additional leverage. The inevitable
disclosure doctrine allows the courts to enjoin an employee from a
range of action, including accepting a new position with a different
employer, even when there has been no trade secret misappropriation
proven and she promises to never misappropriate in the future.45
IM. INEVITABLE DIsCLosuRE DOCTRINE CuRRENmY REVEALS A
TROUBLING UNDER-APPRECIATION FOR THE FORMER EMPLOYER'S
LEGITimATE INTEREST IN EMPLOYEE MOBILrY
The recent high-profile case of PepsiCo v. Redmond46 has
renewed interest in the inevitable disclosure doctrine.47  An
examination of PepsiCo and other recent cases reveals a general trend
focusing very heavily on the risk to the former employer and the
degree of harm it will potentially suffer. However, there is less clarity
regarding how the courts should treat the rights of the individual
employee to earn a living and enjoy job mobility.
A. The PepsiCo Decision Greatly Intensified Interest in
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
1. The PepsiCo Decision
Perhaps the most famous case concerning the inevitable
disclosure doctrine is PepsiCo v. Redmond. In that case, defendant
William Redmond was a former manager for PepsiCo North America.
Redmond had worked for PepsiCo in its Pepsi-Cola North American
division for ten years and had recently been promoted to general
manager of PepsiCo's California business unit.48 Redmond had
41. POOLEY, supra note 5, at 7-14.
42. See, e.g., Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1433-34 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
43. Id. at 1433 n.17.
44. See, e.g., id. at 1435-38.
45. See infra Part Ill.
46. PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
47. See Edelstein, supra note 33.
48. See PepsiCo, 54 F. 3d at 1264.
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access and exposure to PepsiCo's strategic plans, to operational
innovations, and to marketing decisions.49
In 1994, Redmond accepted an offer from Quaker Oats Co. to
become the chief operating officer of Quaker Oats' Gatorade and
Snapple divisions.50 Redmond had kept his negotiations with Quaker
Oats secret.51 Redmond also briefly misled PepsiCo by telling it that
he was considering a job offer from Quaker when in fact he had
already accepted the offer.52
The district court granted PepsiCo's request for a preliminary
injunction, preventing Redmond from taking the position.53 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, accepting the district court's doubts about
Redmond's sincerity when he promised not to use the PepsiCo
information at his new position.54 The Seventh Circuit explained that
even if he could avoid consciously disclosing or using PepsiCo's
information, Redmond would still be unable to "compartmentalize"
the trade secrets.55  Further, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
Redmond in his new job would necessarily be making decisions using
PepsiCo trade secret material. 56  Noting the fierce competition
between the two companies 57 and the sensitive nature of the
marketing data that Redmond had been exposed to,58 the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the district court had properly found a threat of
misappropriation.
2. PepsiCo's Analysis of the Impact on the Employee
The decision did acknowledge Redmond's abstract interest in job
mobility.59 Oddly, it failed to analyze the potential harm to Redmond
from the injunction with the same level of care that it applied when
analyzing PepsiCo's need for the injunction. In the process, the court
issued a broad injunction effectively preventing Redmond from taking
49. See id. at 1265.
50. See id. at 1264.
51. Seeid.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1267.
54. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-71.
55. See id. at 1269.
56. See id. at 1270-71.
57. See iL. at 1263.
58. See id. at 1270.
59. See id. at 1268 ("[The] law should not prevent workers from pursuing their livelihoods
when they leave their current positions.").
PREVENTING POST-PEPSICO DISASTER
the job.60
This uneven treatment of the employee's interests is disturbing.
Taken to the extreme, inevitable disclosure can result in a blanket
prohibition against any new work involving a specialist's area of
knowledge, at least with any organization that would find the
specialist's knowledge useful. For example, there should be some
concern the injunction in PepsiCo may impact Redmond's ability to
use his knowledge of the beverage marketing industry in general as
well as his particular knowledge of PepsiCo's marketing plans.
In effect, an extreme application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine would be equivalent to a very broad noncompetition
agreement, with the critical difference being that the employer is
forcing the restrictions upon the former employee without the
opportunity to negotiate. Such an involuntary, after-the-fact
restriction on a former employee's ability to earn a living is very
troubling, and arguably also affects the public interest in vigorous
competition and a mobile workforce.
B. Inevitable Disclosure Case Law Currently Treats Individual
Employee Rights Unevenly
The existing case law regarding inevitable disclosure doctrine
does not clearly teach how much weight should be given to the impact
of an injunction on the employee's life or new job prospects. While
some courts take such consequences into account, others seem not to;
this is not really surprising, since no standard has been clearly
articulated yet.
1. The Substantive Due Process Experience Suggests
Reasonable Limitations on Employment are Acceptable
At one end of the spectrum, some courts refuse to apply the
inevitable disclosure doctrine at all. In those cases "the courts
typically will emphasize the devastating consequences to the
individual employee and the lack of special circumstances in the case
that might indicate that the defendant cannot be trusted. '61
This strand of cases seems to express a significant concern for
the individual employee, and perhaps is exemplified by AMP Inc. v.
Fleischhacker.62 Although the legal weight of this case might be
60. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d. at 1272.
61. POOLEY, supra note 5, at 7-16.
62. AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1995).
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questioned,63 it still has instructive value. The AMP court rejected an
application for a preliminary injunction.64 Like in PepsiCo, the AMP
court considered the factors of risk and harm to the plaintiff AMP to
be important. 65 But the AMP court also expressed significant concern
for the defendant, Fleischhacker. For example, the AMP court noted
that "[T]he practical effect of any grant of injunctive relief in favor of
AMP would be to prohibit Mr. Fleischhacker from working in the
connector industry. '66
A post-PepsiCo case that also expresses significant concern for
employee rights is FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co.67 FMC
rejected an inevitable disclosure analysis. 68 In that case, Joseph
Fickling had worked as an engineer for FMC, dealing with lithium
battery technology, considered a valuable technical specialty. 69
Fickling worked for FMC for fourteen years before he decided to take
a better position at Cyprus Foote, FMC's direct competitor.70
FMC requested a preliminary injunction preventing the new
employment, 71 claiming that the only reason Cyprus Foote hired
Fickling was that Cyprus Foote had a critical need to acquire lithium
battery technology.72
However, the FMC court did not find significant risk to the
plaintiff, whom it emphasized had failed to produce "some showing
of bad faith, underhanded dealing, or employment by an entity so
plainly lacking comparable technology that misappropriation can be
inferred.' '73 Fickling had not offered to reveal any of FMC's trade
secrets,74 nor had he taken any secret material with him.75 In
addition, there was no evidence that Cyprus Foote had tried to target
Fickling, which undercut FMC's assertion that there was a plan to
63. AMP predates the adoption of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, which abolished any
common law remedies. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. However, in PepsiCo it was noted that
"[Tihe rTSA mostly codifies rather than modifies the common law doctrine that preceded it.
Thus, we believe that AMP continues to reflect the proper standard." See id.
64. See AMP, Inc., 823 F.2d at 1200-01.
65. See id. at 1206-07.
66. Il at 1205.
67. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477 (7th Cir. 1995).
68. See icL
69. See id. at 1480.
70. See id. at 1479-80.
71. See id at 1480.
72. See id.
73. FMC Corp., 899 F. Supp. at 1483.
74. See id. at 1480.
75. See id. at 1481.
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misappropriate. 76
The FMC court noted that the general technical expertise gained
by an employee while working for his former employer is not one of
the former employer's trade secrets, but can be taken by the employee
to a new employer.77 In addition, the FMC court expressed a concern
that "the potential harm to Fickling [was] very great"'78 because the
effect of the, requested injunction would have been to block his
working in his chosen field of expertise. "[IWf the doctrine is applied
[liberally].. . then no employee could ever work [in his specialty] for
his former employer's competitor on the theory that disclosure of
confidential information is inevitable. '79 The FMC court found that
result unacceptable. "Fickling can perform any number of tasks from
typing to management, but he would rather not start a second career at
this point." 80
2. Some Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
with Cautious Respect for Individual Rights
Some courts have applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
while carefully limiting the scope and duration of the injunction to
avoid excessively impinging the individual employee's, rights. For
example, courts have limited injunctions to particular products and
areas of business. 81 Even the injunction on employment at Quaker
Oats in PepsiCo was limited in time to about five and a half months.82
Another post-PepsiCo case in which the court took a careful
approach is Merck & Co. v. Lyon83, which effectively limited the
holding of FMC. Gary Lyon worked for Merck as a marketing
specialist focusing on its Pepcid AC product.84 In 1996, Lyon left to
work for Glaxo Wellcome as its director of global marketing.85 His
responsibilities included Zantac 75, a product in direct competition
with Pepcid AC.86
The Merck court refused to completely enjoin the new
76. See id.
77. See id at 1482.
78. Id. at 1483.
79. FMC Corp., 899 F. Supp. at 1482.
80. See id at 1484.
81. See POOLEY, supra note 5, at 7-16. The Merck case discussed next is a good example.
82. See PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995).
83. Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
84. See id. at 1447.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1448.
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employment without a very strong showing of risk that Lyon would
be likely to disclose a trade secret.87 However, it distinguished FMC
based on the scope of the requested injunction.88 Merck carefully
limited its injunction request to work regarding a particular product,
Zantac 75.89 It thus avoided threatening Lyon's ability to work in his
general area of expertise.
The court reasoned that when the trade secret is "clearly
identified and of significant value .... bad faith or underhanded
dealing by the former employee or new employer would not
necessarily be required."90 When the injunction is carefully limited,
explained the court, the plaintiff need only show a "degree of
similarity between the employee's former and current position, and
the value of the information." 91
3. Some Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Aggressively with Little Attention to Individual Rights
At the other extreme, some cases appear to give very little or no
consideration at all to the former employee's interests. In pre-
PepsiCo cases, some courts issued injunctions that were very harsh
both in scope 92 and in duration.93 Those courts expressed very little
interest in balancing the defendants' right to earn a living relative to
other factors. 94
For a post-PepsiCo example, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa has recently applied the inevitable
disclosure doctrine to place a significant burden on the departing
employee. In Uncle B's Bakery Inc. v. O'Rourke,95 the trade secret
concerned a process for making bagels. Kevin O'Rourke worked as a
manager for Uncle B's, 9 6 and in that capacity was exposed to and
became very familiar with Uncle B's secret bagel-making process. 97
87. See id. at 1455.
88. See id. at 1458.
-89. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1458. The court also limited the duration of the injunction
to one to two years. See id. at 1464-1465.
90. Id. at 1460.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1188 (5th Cir. 1984)
(affirming injunction against use of information in 14 different areas).
93. See, e.g., Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205, 1236 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (issuing
a permanent injunction).
94. See generally POOLEY, supra note 5, at 7-17.
95. Uncle B's Bakery Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
96. See ld at 1409, 1416.
97. See id. at 1432-33.
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O'Rourke subsequently accepted a job as a plant manager for a
competitor, Brooklyn Bagel Boys. 98 Uncle B's applied for an
injunction preventing O'Rourke from working for the competition. 99
O'Rourke testified that he had not disclosed any trade secrets
regarding the bagel-making process and that he would not do so.100
In addition, Brooklyn Bagel Boys had explicitly requested that
O'Rourke disclose no trade secrets. 101  These promises were
supported by certain aspects of the Brooklyn Bagel Boys' operation,
which employed significantly different recipes and processes. 102 The
defendants argued that it would be impossible to revamp Brooklyn
Bagel Boys' production line to incorporate Uncle B's recipe. 103
The Iowa court was not impressed by these arguments, and
articulated a standard of proof that would have made it extremely
difficult for any employee to defend against. The court held that
because the plaintiff had "reason to fear that [Brooklyn Bagel] will be
motivated to appropriate its technology and processes,"'1 04 Uncle B's
only had to show that "[w]here the... [general] knowledge ends and
the other begins is sufficiently uncertain.. . to raise a realistic threat
of inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets .... 105
The Iowa court made passing mention of the injunction's impact
on O'Rourke. 106 It nevertheless ignored his interests and issued a
broad injunction prohibiting O'Rourke from working for any
competitor within 500 miles of any Uncle B's bakery.'07 The
injunction seems very harsh considering that there was no actual
misappropriation proven.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE SHOULD MAINTAIN A REASONABLE LEVEL OF
RESPECT FOR EMPLOYEE MOBILITY
When there is such apparent confusion over the application of
legal doctrine, often it is instructive to examine a second, similar legal
problem and draw lessons from the analytical framework applied to
98. See id. at 1420.
99. See id. at 1409.
100. See id. at 1420.
101. See Uncle B's Bakery, 920 F. Supp. at 1420.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Il at 1436.
105. Id. at 1435.
106. See id. at 1437.
107. See Uncle B's Bakery, 920 F. Supp. at 1441.
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the second problem. Thus, one approach to improving inevitable
disclosure doctrine may be found by analogy to the law in substantive
due process analysis. Similar questions regarding how far restrictions
on employee mobility and the right to livelihood can extend have
arisen in this constitutional arena. Specifically, substantive due
process analysis has been used to review government regulation of
employment, especially when the government has completely
excluded people from certain types of private and public
employment.10s
It is true that substantive due process cases require some sort of
state action. 109 Thus, substantive due process law does not directly
apply to cases strictly between private parties such as PepsiCo.
However, an examination of substantive due process analysis may
still indirectly provide an instructive aid to inevitable disclosure
doctrine.
This section will argue that certain applications of inevitable
disclosure doctrine share common ground with substantive due
process, and that ideas in substantive due process are applicable to the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. Substantive due process analysis
maintains a foundation of respect for individual rights, and that
respect should also be present in inevitable disclosure doctrine.
A. Overview: Inevitable Disclosure and Substantive Due
Process Analysis of Government Employment Restrictions
both Fundamentally Involve Locating Reasonable Limits on
Interference with the Right to Livelihood
The thorniest issue in inevitable disclosure doctrine relates to
what extent a judge can restrict the employment opportunities of an
individual at the behest of a private party. When can a court restrict a
person from working in their chosen profession? When can a court
prevent a person from working for their chosen employer?
Analogous questions have arisen in several substantive due process
contexts regarding how far various government entities can restrict an
individual's choice of employment. 110
In the arena of economic regulation, the courts have articulated a
general standard of review regarding restrictions on the freedom to
108. See infra Part IV.B.2.
109. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUrIONAL LAW § 18-1, at
1688 (1988 2nd ed.).
110. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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earn a living.111 Rationally limited intrusions on how one makes a
living, such as maximum hours that can be worked, have been
upheld." 2  Thus, substantive due process does not suggest a
prohibition on reasonable applications of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine.
However, the Court has sent signals that there should be limits to
such intrusions. For example, substantive due process analysis has
been applied to licensing requirements for professions that exclude
members of certain groups. 113 Such requirements have been upheld,
but not in extreme and unreasonable circumstances. 114 In addition,
substantive due process protection has been applied to strike down
statutes that absolutely prevent certain classes of people from working
for a particular employer. n 5  This is especially true when the
employer is the federal government. 116
B. Substantive Due Process Analysis of the Deprivation of
Employment by the Government Suggests an Approach that
Gives Reasonable Respect for Employment Mobility
1. Substantive Due Process Suggests that the Government
Can Create Reasonable Limitations on Employment
Mobility
The Fourteenth Amendment provides the basis for substantive
due process protection regarding state law. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment states that "No state shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... 117 The protection of due process that binds the states is
also extended to the federal government via the Fifth Amendment,
"No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ,1 18
Substantive due process protection for mere "economic rights" is
not extremely aggressive. 19 This is in contrast to the early part of the
century, when the U.S. Supreme Court closely examined state
111. See id
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id
115. See id.
116. See infra Part IV.B.2.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. See generally TREBE, supra note 109, § 8-7, at 581-86.
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economic regulation. A prime example of this earlier approach is
Lochner v. New York.120
In that case, the Court struck a state law regulating the maximum
hours which bakery employees could work. Lochner held that there
must be a very close fit between the statute and the objective it was
meant to serve. 121  In addition, only certain objectives were
acceptable. Those acceptable objectives were limited to the
regulation of health and safety, and had to be more than mere
readjustment of economic power.122
The earlier approach was swept away during the New Deal era.
The Court has since then significantly restricted its review of state
economic regulation for substantive due process violations. The
Court now reviews general economic regulation cases under the
minimal scrutiny or "rational basis" standard. 123
The Court's application of this current standard is quite
deferential. It is remarkable that the Court has not struck a general
economic regulation on purely substantive due process grounds since
1937.124 If the current substantive due process analytical framework
is examined to glean ideas for inevitable disclosure doctrine, such an
examination would not seem to suggest that applications of inevitable
disclosure doctrine are impermissible per se.
In fact, this type of analysis could be applied to the inevitable
disclosure doctrine to help develop a balanced approach. The
protection of intellectual property does help create an incentive to
produce valuable innovation, which is a socially productive
objective.125 Issuing injunctions before actual misappropriation has
occurred, based on estimates of risk and harm, may or may not be the
ideal way to protect trade secrets. However, in situations where
deferential minimal scrutiny is appropriate, the means used do not
have to be the least intrusive available. As long as the measures taken
120. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
121. See id. at 62-63.
122. See id. at 64.
123. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, (1978). The courts should defer to legislative judgment regarding economic interests
"unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or irrational." See id. at 84.
124. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 462 (12th ed. 1991). However, the
Court has taken significant substantive due process protection measures in important cases;
these substantive due process measures have merely been mixed in with other constitutional
issues. See infra Part IV.B.2.
125. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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are not irrational, they are defensible. 126
However, a further examination of substantive due process
reveals that the Court has endorsed some significant protections
regarding the right to earn a living.127 It should be emphasized that
unreasonable regulation by the government is not permissible. 128
Certain applications of the inevitable disclosure doctrine appear to go
beyond reasonable restrictions, and should be similarly avoided.
2. Substantive Due Process Commentary and Case Law
Do Not Support Extreme Deprivation of Employment
Similar to that which Results from Overaggressive
Application of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
The Supreme Court in recent years has subjected general
economic regulation and "purely economic" rights to minimal
substantive due process scrutiny.129 However, the Court has indicated
that state interference with the right to engage in one's chosen
occupation does implicate certain important elements of personal
autonomy above mere economic interests. 130
A strong argument can be made that American law can and has
generally recognized the importance of the specific right to make a
living. Professor Chester Antieau has noted that "[tihe American
Founding Fathers in enshrining in our early constitutions 'liberty' and
'the pursuit of happiness' intended to recognize jurally the right of all
men to develop their talents as they saw fit, subject only to reasonable
controls necessitated by the common weal."'131 This statement
suggests a general respect for employment free of unnecessary
interference. In light of this respect, extremely restrictive inevitable
disclosure injunctions, such as the one issued in Uncle B's, seem
undesirable.
In addition, while there are few recent pure substantive due
process cases, there are cases involving both substantive due process
and other doctrines that support reasonable scrutiny of restrictions on
occupation. It is interesting to note that some of those disapproved
governmental restrictions are similar in impact to the private
restrictions that are created by overreaching application of the
126. See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 82-87.
127. See infra Part IV.B.2.
128. See id.
129. See generally Tribe, supra note 109, § 8-7, at 581-86.
130. See id.
131. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU 1, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.00 (2nd ed. 1997).
1999]
398 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol.15
inevitable disclosure doctrine.
One such case is Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New
Mexico.132 In Schware, the Court held that states may not prevent a
person from practicing his chosen occupation for arbitrary reasons. 133
The plaintiff in Schware had been a member of the Communist
Party. 134 The state bar association prevented him from receiving a
license to practice law in New Mexico based in part on that previous
membership. 135 The Court noted that "[a] State cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a
manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause." 136 The Court then held that the Board of Bar
Examiners should only consider factors that "have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law,"'137
and that membership in the Communist Party lacked any rational
connection to practicing law. 138
Thus, the Court appears to have expressed significant respect for
the ability to practice one's area of professional specialization. If the
government cannot arbitrarily take away the ability to practice one's
occupation at the behest of a board of bar examiners, arguably neither
should it arbitrarily take away that ability at the behest of a private
employer. Thus, an extremely broad inevitable disclosure injunction
that completely prevents or very significantly affects the ability to
practice one's profession, should be avoided.
Another interesting case that further suggests the desirability of
protection of the right to livelihood is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. 139
That case involved a restriction on individuals working for their
chosen employer, specifically a regulation that banned all non-
citizens from working in the federal civil service. 140 In perhaps the
most important part of the case, the Court reasoned that the right to
work for that particular employer had an important impact on the
individual's liberty. 14 1 Thus, the right to work in the civil service
132. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 236-38.
135. See id. at 238.
136. Id. at 238-39.
137. m at 239.
138. See Schware, 353 U.S. at 246-47.
139. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
140. It should be noted that there were equal protection issues, involving the plaintiffs'
alienage, mixed in with the substantive due process analysis. See id. at 100.
141. See id. at 102.
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could be regarded as an "interest in liberty" and deserved due process
protection. 142 Especially interesting is the Court's statement that "[i]t
requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of...
personal freedom and opportunity .... 143
The Court went on to strike down the Civil Service Commission
rules barring all non-citizens from employment in the federal civil
service as not "justified by reasons which are properly the concern of
the [the Civil Service Commission]." 144 This test is arguably more
demanding than the "rational basis" test.145 In Mow Sun Wong the
Court appears to have also expressed a respect for the qualified
individual's ability to work for his chosen employer,, at least when the
employer is the federal government.
In fact, Professor Laurence Tribe suggests that Mow Sun Wong
could be applied even more generally. He notes that "[tihe mode of
analysis employed by the Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong may
provide a model for future cases involving governmental
infringements of personal freedom to pursue a vocation." 146
Tribe suggests applying an analytical framework that examines
factors that include:
(1) the breadth of the infringement, (2) the character of the group
upon which it was imposed, (3) the nature and responsibilities of
the body that imposed it, (4) the availability of less restorative
alternatives, (5) the reasons actually canvassed in the process of
adopting the challenged rule, and (6) the arguments made in
defense of the rule enforcement.147
Factors 1, 4, and 6 seem particularly applicable to inevitable
disclosure injunctions that completely forbid any type of employment
with a particular employer. The impact of an inevitable disclosure
injunction that forbids an individual from doing any sort of work for a
particular employer is very similar to the regulation in Mow Sun
Wong, which forbade an individual from doing any sort of work for a
specific new employer: the federal government. If it is so undesirable
for the state to arbitrarily bar an individual from working for his
chosen employer, it can also be argued that it is equally undesirable to
142. See id.
143. Id at 103 n.23, citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
144. Id. at 116.
145. See generally TRIBE, supra note 109, § 15-13, at 1376.
146. Id. § 15-13, at 1377.
147. Id
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allow private parties to use the courts to arbitrarily restrict an
individual's choice of employer as well. It seems reasonable to apply
ideas from the analysis in Mow Sun Wong to this type of inevitable
disclosure injunction.
Thus, while substantive due process does condone some
restrictions on employment, it also suggests limits. A significant
degree of caution has been expressed when the restrictions would
have a major impact on the ability to earn a living. As this Part has
discussed, under certain circumstances the courts have refused to
uphold government restrictions that completely prevent the individual
from working in her chosen profession or for her preferred employer.
The courts could, and should, easily apply that same caution to
private employment restriction requests.
V. APPLYING LEssONS FROM THE SUBSTANTIVEDUa PROCESS
COMMENTARY AND THE SCHWAREIMowSUN WONG ANALYSIS TO
INEVrrABLE DIsCLOsuRE DocTm'E
Substantive due process law clearly shows that an individual's
ability to practice her livelihood is worthy of serious respect.
Regardless of substantive due process doctrine's direct applicability,
reasonable analysis and decision-making would be improved by
incorporating elements from this constitutional concept into inevitable
disclosure cases. This comment recommends the following approach.
A. Assessment of the Former Employer's Needs
The starting point for inevitable disclosure should still be an
examination of the need for an injunction in the absence of a showing
of past or current misappropriation. The risk of irreparable
destruction or compromise of the plaintiff's interests remains the
logical threshold question in any injunction proceeding. Courts
should also continue to examine whether underhanded behavior by
the former employee or new employer indicates that either would be
likely to misappropriate the former employer's trade secrets in the
future.
The magnitude of harm from possible misappropriation is also
relevant to the rationality of issuing an injunction. The nature of the
secret, how critical it is to the former employer, and how irreparable
the damage resulting from its misappropriation are all relevant
factors. The analysis of risk and harm will produce an estimate of the
threat of misappropriation posed by the employee's new employment.
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B. However, Only if the Former Employer Has a Significant
Interest Can the Employer's Interest in Protection
Rationally Outweigh the Individual's Right to Livelihood
As shown in Part III, in many cases courts have concentrated
very heavily and almost exclusively, on the first two factors of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine analysis: (1) the risk of
misappropriation and (2) the harm that would flow from
misappropriation. The third factor, the impact on the individual
employee, often appears as only an afterthought. A comparison to
substantive due process analysis illustrates that this casual treatment
of the impact on the former employee is highly questionable. The
intrusion on personal liberty is always a serious matter to be avoided
whenever possible. It is worthy of emphasis equal to the first two
factors.
If the Tribe-style. analysis of Schware and Mow Sun Wong is
applied to inevitable disclosure doctrine, a weak showing of the threat
of misappropriation should result in an injunction not being issued. In
such a case, the legitimate interest in protecting intellectual property
would not be undercut by the absence of an injunction, because the
benefit of that injunction would be so minimal. In fact, when the
resulting damage from an injunction outweighs the minimal danger,
the inevitable disclosure doctrine irrationally over-protects the
legitimate interest in intellectual property protection.
However, when a sufficiently strong showing of risk and harm
supports the conclusion that a threat of misappropriation exists, the
issuance of an injunction would be an acceptable intrusion on the
individual's rights. The interest in preventing harm to the former
employer would, in this scenario, outweigh its impact on the
individual.
C. However, Carefully Limited Restrictions Are Acceptable and
Only Under Very Rare Circumstances Should Broad
Injunctions Issue
However, the determination that there is a rational showing of
danger of misappropriation worthy of an injunction should not end the
inquiry. As in Uncle B's, courts also fail to adequately consider the
employee interest when fashioning the scope of relief to be granted.
The restrictions placed on the former employee and the scope of
the material that former employee may not use should have
reasonable bounds. For example, in E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-
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Dunn, Inc. 148 the Eighth Circuit struck down an injunction against use
of "trade secrets and confidential technical information" of the
plaintiff as being too vague and overbroad. 149 As the Eighth Circuit
stated, the defendants should not be required to "test their legal
opinion on the law of trade secrets and their technical opinion on the
state of the prior art... to show cause why they should not be held in
contempt."150
An analogy to substantive due process case law strongly
reinforces common law cases like E.W. Bliss. It must be reiterated
that the individual's right to a livelihood does not evaporate as soon
as the judge decides an injunction should issue. The employer's
interest in intellectual property protection ought to be balanced with
the employee's interest in her right to livelihood at all stages of the
analysis. Injunctions like the one found in Uncle B's are
unnecessarily broad in scope and duration, especially when narrowly
tailored injunctions like the injunction in Merck are adequate. Overly
broad injunctions should be challenged as an inappropriate intrusion
on the former employee's right to livelihood.
Through broad injunctions, a court allows the employer to
deeply intrude on the individual's right to make a living. Enjoining
the individual from working for her particular chosen employer is
similar in effect to the total prohibition on working for the
government that was struck down in Mow Sun Wong. An even
broader injunction against working for any competitor can result in an
employee's being completely shut out of his chosen profession for an
indefinite period. That result smacks of the same unfairness as the
unconstitutional licensing struck down in Schware. Arguably, both
types of results should be avoided.
D. Ideas Regarding a Limited Injunction
If only a carefully balanced injunction will sufficiently protect
the interests of both parties, the question remains how the limited
injunction should be crafted. An interesting approach can be
imported from the field of legal ethics. When a lawyer changes law
firms and his new firm comes into conflict with a client of the former
firm, in many jurisdictions an "ethical wall" may be formed to
prevent the disclosure of confidential information. The employee can
148. E.W. Bliss v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969).
149. See E.W. Bliss, 408 F.2d at 1113-14; see also American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742
F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing how to frame an injunction).
150. E.W. Bliss, 408 F. 2d at 1114.
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work at the firm, but only if precautions are taken.
A good description of the elements of an ethical wall is found in
the California case, Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan.151
'The typical elements of an ethical wall are: physical, geographic, and
departmental separation of attorneys; prohibitions against and
sanctions for discussing confidential matters; established rules and
procedures preventing access to confidential information and
files ... "152
A subtly and narrowly crafted injunction, when combined with
reasonable time limits, can provide the employer with sufficient trade
secret protection while leaving the former employee with a reasonable
opportunity to make a living in her specialty. For example, the
injunction in Merck was well-crafted in scope as well as in
duration. 153 A broad injunction on employment with a particular
employer or in a particular area should only be issued when there is
no way to create an effective ethical wall and an extreme threat of
disclosure exists.
As substantive due process analysis helps illustrate, the courts
should be extremely reluctant to issue such an injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employee mobility today is more important than ever. In a
world of corporate downsizing154 an individual employee benefits
enormously from being able to move to a new employer before being
laid off. In addition, it has been argued that a major reason that
companies in places like Silicon Valley produce so much
technological innovation is because of the high employee mobility in
those locations. 155  The PepsiCo case left us with challenging
questions about how to balance the employer's interest in preventing
the otherwise inevitable disclosure of valuable trade secrets with the
equally important individual interest in the free pursuit of an
occupation.
151. Henriksen v. Great American Sav. & Loan, 11 Cal. 4th 113, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1984
(Cal. App. 1992).
152. Id. at 116 n.6.
153. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1464-65 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (issuing an
injunction with duration of one to two years and only affecting work on a specific product).
154. Compare DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF
WORKING AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL "DowNsilING" (1996).
155. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE CULTURE AND
COMPETTON IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
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The PepsiCo court's efforts regarding analogous employment
restrictions in the substantive due process area teach that freedom of
employment is worthy of a substantial amount of respect. The
extreme approach taken by the Iowa court in Uncle B's unreasonably
impinges on the individual employee's legitimate interests in mobility
and the freedom to practice her occupation. A moderate approach,
similar to one the North Carolina courts have adopted, allows the
inevitable disclosure doctrine to provide narrow injunction requests,
but prevents overly broad prohibitions on new employment. 156
The inevitable disclosure doctrine may be a fair and useful tool
to safeguard intellectual property. However, careless application by
the courts will result in the unacceptable restriction of employee
mobility. The new approach described above does not represent a
radical change. Many judges instinctively afford significant weight to
the defendant's interests in trade secrets cases. What this approach
does is explicitly ensure thoughtful balancing, and provide a specific
analytical framework that all parties can use to shape their
expectations. The suggestions from substantive due process analysis,
when combined with the common law in this area, indicate the
reasonable limits that the inevitable disclosure doctrine so desperately
needs.
In closing, Professor Tribe points out that Justice Douglas may
have provided a particularly good insight into restriction on
occupation. 157 Justice Douglas noted that:
The right to work I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that
man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to
live, to be free, to own property .... It does many men little good
to stay alive and free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work
means to eat. It also means to live.158
Justice Douglas went on to say:
[C]ertainly a man has no affirmative right to any particular job or
skill or occupation .... But [the Bill of Rights] does say that
certain rights are protected, that certain things shall not be done.
And so the question here is not what government must give, but
rather what it may not take away. 159
156. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral
Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
157. See TRIBE, supra note 109, § 15-13, at 1376.
158. Barsky v. Bd. of Regents of the State of New York, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at472-73.
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The government should not be able to take away the right to
control one's livelihood without adequate safeguards. Neither should
a private party when it invokes the inevitable disclosure doctrine.

